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Abstract
Background: The wide-ranging program of reforms brought about by the Health and Social Care Act (2012) in England
fundamentally changed the operation of the public health system, moving responsibility for the commissioning and
delivery of services from the National Health Service to locally elected councils and a new national public health agency.
This paper explores the ways in which the reforms have altered public health commissioning.
Methods: We conducted multi-methods research over 33 months, incorporating national surveys of Directors of Public
Health and local council elected members at two time-points, and in-depth case studies in five purposively selected
geographical areas.
Results: Public health commissioning responsibilities have changed and become more fragmented, being split
amongst a range of different organisations, most of which were newly created in 2013. There is much change in the
way public health commissioning is done, in who is doing it, and in what is commissioned, since the reforms. There is
wider consultation on decisions in the local council setting than in the NHS, and elected members now have a strong
influence on public health prioritisation. There is more (and different) scrutiny being applied to public health contracts,
and most councils have embarked on wide-ranging changes to the health improvement services they commission.
Public health money is being used in different ways as councils are adapting to increasing financial constraint.
Conclusions: Our findings suggest that, while some of the intended opportunities to improve population health and
create a more joined-up system with clearer leadership have been achieved, fragmentation, dispersed decision-making
and uncertainties regarding funding remain significant challenges. There have been profound changes in commissioning
processes, with consequences for what health improvement services are ultimately commissioned. Time (and further
research) will tell if any of these changes lead to improved population health outcomes and reduced health inequalities,
but many of the opportunities brought about by the reforms are threatened by the continued flux in the system.
Keywords: Health sector reform, Public health commissioning, Health improvement, Local government
Background
The UK government elected in 2010 embarked on a
wide-ranging program of reforms to the health and so-
cial care systems in England. The Health and Social Care
Act (2012) formed the centrepiece of the reforms, intro-
ducing extensive changes to the organisation, structure
and delivery of health services. As part of these changes,
key public health functions were transferred from the
National Health Service (NHS) to local government
councils. This transfer included specialist public health
staff and the budget for commissioning a range of public
health services, including sexual health services, public
health nursing, drug and alcohol treatment, smoking
cessation and weight management services. In addition,
a national public health agency (Public Health England,
PHE) was established, as the national leadership body
for public health to provide national campaigns and co-
ordinate health protection, and as an active partner in
local initiatives where appropriate [1].
During the reforms, the government highlighted a
number of issues that lay behind inadequate population
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health outcomes. It felt the system was fragmented,
lacked integration and synergies across services and had
overlapping responsibilities [2, 3]. It also felt the system
disempowered public health professionals, insufficiently
valuing their skills [3]. Crucially, the government argued
that there was an insufficient focus on the root causes of
ill health, and pointed to a lack of accountability with
regards to outcomes. Issues faced in England chimed
with cross-cutting themes that emerged from a review of
public health in Europe, notably: the importance of
inter-sectoral working, the existence of wide inequalities
between and within countries in Europe, and the know-
ledge gaps around what public health policies and inter-
ventions are being implemented where, and which are
most effective [4].
In 2012, a new European health policy framework was
developed, to support action across government and so-
ciety to improve the health and well-being of popula-
tions, reduce health inequalities, strengthen public
health and ensure people-centred health systems [5]. It
was in this context that the UK government set out, in
the English reforms, to clarify responsibilities and ac-
countabilities, empower people and communities, and
focus on the evidence of what works. They wanted a
greater emphasis, at all levels, on disease prevention,
and a more joined up approach, with clearer leadership.
In addition, the need to achieve better results with less
money was an undercurrent to the entire health and so-
cial care reforms, driven by the government’s aim to re-
duce their budget deficit.
Prior to the reforms in England, Primary Care Trusts
(PCTs) were the NHS bodies responsible for commission-
ing – strategic planning and purchasing - most health ser-
vices, including for public health [6]. Until 2011, PCTs
also directly managed the vast majority of NHS commu-
nity health services, such as district nursing, health visiting
and children’s services. In 2013, PCTs were abolished and
replaced by a new NHS commissioning architecture, lo-
cally led by Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), and
nationally led by a new independent NHS commissioning
board (NHS England) [7].
Within PCTs, public health specialists tended to pro-
vide a lead role in developing strategies for meeting local
health needs, and specialist clinical and public health ad-
vice to inform PCT commissioning. Whilst public health
was (and remains) an inter-organisational function, with
much close working between PCTs and local councils,
funding remained predominantly from NHS sources, with
most decisions about services and expenditure taken
within an executive decision-making framework by Direc-
tors of Public Health supported by PCT Boards [6, 8].
Public health services are now funded by a public
health budget, separate from the budget managed
through NHS England for healthcare. This budget is
decided by the Department of Health (DoH), and man-
aged by PHE. PHE funds public health activity either
through allocations to upper-tier and unitary councils,
by commissioning services via NHS England, or by
commissioning or providing services itself. Most locally
delivered public health activities are now commissioned
or provided by local councils. The structure of local gov-
ernment in England is complex: there are 27 areas where
services are split between upper-tier county councils
(taking responsibility for social care, education, transpor-
tation and strategic planning), and smaller district coun-
cils (covering e.g. housing, leisure, environmental health
and planning), and there are 125 unitary councils that
provide the full range of services. All of these coun-
cils are run by elected councillors, usually affiliated to
a political party, who represent and engage their local
population, make key decisions, contribute to policy/
strategy review and development, and conduct over-
view and scrutiny roles. Councils have the freedom to
innovate and to make changes locally, under the ‘gen-
eral power of competence’, introduced by the Local-
ism Act 2011 [9]. There are important differences,
then, in the context in which local public health
commissioning is now done.
The Health and Social Care Act also introduced
Health and Wellbeing Boards (HWBs) as statutory sub-
committees of local councils. These boards were
intended to bring together the key NHS, public health
and social care leaders in each local council area to work
together to co-ordinate commissioning of their services.
They are thus an important part of the new health
commissioning landscape [10].
A House of Commons Health Committee inquiry on
public health post-2013, launched October 2015, is start-
ing to raise some important issues related to the struc-
tures, organisation, funding and delivery of public health
following the reforms [11]. However, to date, little aca-
demic attention has been paid to the impact of the
reforms on public health commissioning in England.
This article examines key changes to the public health
system following the reforms, and explores the broad
function of commissioning for health improvement
within the new system. It highlights some important
changes in the way public health commissioning is now
undertaken, in who is doing it, and in what is commis-
sioned. It draws on findings from a 3-year research study
funded by the DoH, which examined the impact of
structural changes on the functioning of the public
health system, and on the approaches taken to im-
proving the public’s health. The article critically ex-
amines these findings in the context of the intentions
of the reforms to create a more joined-up system
with clearer leadership and greater opportunities to
improve population health.
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Methods
The PHOENIX study was a 3-year research project to
examine the impact of structural reforms on the func-
tioning of the public health system in England. It was an
exploratory study that took place from the time of tran-
sition (April 2013), and so could explore the ways in
which the planning, organisation, commissioning and de-
livery of health improvement services were changing over
time as the new structures bedded in. One of its objectives
was to examine approaches taken to commissioning
within the new system, using obesity as a focal topic.
The study incorporated multiple methods. In a scop-
ing review [12], we analysed policy documents and re-
sponses to the reforms from key stakeholders [13],
developed a picture of how the new structures were de-
veloping, and collated demographic and other data on
all 152 upper-tier and unitary local councils in England.
This review identified the key themes to follow up on in
the next phase of the research. It also enabled the pur-
posive selection of local councils for later case study re-
search, conducted from March 2014 to September 2015,
in five areas. The areas were purposively selected for
maximum variation across a a range of characteristics
related to the councils and the populations they serve
(including council type, size, urban or rural location, var-
ied socio-demographic and economic circumstances,
obesity prevalence and different political control) in
order to provide a diverse range of cases. The five areas
(described in Table 1) encompassed 13 different coun-
cils, including unitary, upper-tier and a sample of lower-
tier (district) councils, some of which had a variety of
different sharing arrangements. This enabled an examin-
ation of multiple perspectives and inter- and intra-
organisational relationships.
Within the case study areas, 103 semi-structured inter-
views were conducted (see Table 1) with 36 council public
health staff; 18 elected members; 25 council non-public
health staff; 13 provider organisation staff; six CCG staff
and three other staff at regional levels. Three members of
the research team were allocated across the case study
sites to enable each researcher to develop a deep under-
standing of and good relationships within each area. Fif-
teen meetings were observed and documentary evidence
was collated to enrich our understanding of the case study
areas. A further five interviews were conducted with key
informants outside of the case study areas, particularly to
explore national and regional level issues and relationships
with/within PHE.
In the autumn of 2015, a web-based questionnaire was
sent to all Directors of Public Health (DsPH), and to
councillors in all 152 upper-tier and unitary councils
who had a public health brief. Usable responses were re-
ceived from 49% of DsPH and 32% of elected members.
The questionnaire was broadly a repeat of a survey
conducted the previous year (not reported in this
paper). The distribution of responses from local coun-
cils was highly representative overall. Data was ana-
lysed using SPSS.
Qualitative data was analysed on a case and theme-
based approach, using NVIVO 10. Multi-investigator,
multi-site and multi-method triangulation was used in
an ongoing and iterative process of bringing together
and interrogating the data. Reflexive, narrative accounts
of each case study area were shared with the research
team, which was made up of experts in public health,
local government, ethnography, and public policy. Rich
interpretations of emergent themes across the cases
were developed collaboratively, paying particular atten-
tion to roles and relationships, power/autonomy, and
decision-making processes. Analysis drew on a number
of integrative theoretical frameworks, employing con-
cepts and ideas drawn from a number of different para-
digms [14, 15]. Ongoing analysis of the data allowed
shifts in focus according to the interplay between theory,
concepts and data, enabling sensitivity to the constantly
changing field of study.
Ethical approval was granted by the university research
ethics committee, and research governance approvals
were obtained for each case study site.
Results
Throughout analysis, commissioning was considered as
one of the broad aspects of public health activity. As a
theme, it included identifying needs, reviewing service
provision, deciding priorities, procuring services, and
managing performance. Our research set out to examine
Table 1 Case study sites
Site Description Number of
interviews
A Large county council (Conservative), including sample of 2 different sized district councils and adjacent unitary council 23
B Cluster of three urban unitary councils (two Conservative, 1 Labour) with shared DPH 13
C Urban metropolitan unitary council (Labour) 23
D County council (Conservative), including sample of 2 different sized district councils, adjacent county council and unitary city
council
22
E Urban metropolitan unitary council (Labour), working with network of other urban unitary authorities 22
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the context for commissioning, the people/organisations
involved in commissioning activities, the processes in-
volved, and any evidence of things changing.
The context for commissioning
The transfer of public health staff and resources into
local councils from PCTs was far from straightforward,
and often accompanied other system reorganisations.
For instance, in one of our case study areas, staff in a
PCT were separated into a council public health team,
one of three CCGs, or into a provider trust. One chil-
dren’s public health commissioner who was formerly in
the children’s joint commissioning team in the PCT with
commissioning responsibilities for the whole of the 0–19
pathway, was transferred to a council team. Her former
commissioning responsibilities were split amongst differ-
ent organisations, and she was now responsible only for
certain elements of the healthy child programme. She
explained the resulting confusion:
“… It has caused fragmentation of the system and
certainly for the 0–19 pathway or services for children,
you know, the health services for children. It has
meant that different parts of the system are now
responsible for commissioning different elements of it
…, which is challenging” (senior public health
commissioner, council, site B).
This also had implications for the sharing of informa-
tion between health and council commissioners, which
this officer described as being “much more difficult for
us now”.
Some public health staff chose to join PHE or NHS
England, and some became part of new commissioning
support organisations. There was much confusion over
where staff should be transferred to (sometimes depend-
ing on the proportion of their time spent on service
commissioning versus service provision), and around the
organisation of budgets. There were instances where this
tested relationships between councils and CCGs.
Local councils received their public health staff, re-
sources and duties at a time of unprecedented cuts to
their budgets [16]. These cuts precipitated ongoing re-
structures within councils which sought to streamline
their organisations and reduce staffing costs. The posi-
tioning of public health teams within councils varied.
Our survey found that 26% (N = 73) of the public health
teams were distinct public health directorates; 52% were
sections of another directorate; and 22% had other ar-
rangements, including merged, distributed and mixed
models. DsPH also had different levels of access to key
council decision-making bodies (53% of DsPH respon-
dents were members of the council’s most senior corpor-
ate management team), and different line-management
structures (47% said that they were managerially respon-
sible to the council’s chief executive; 53% were managed
by a range of other directorate heads). Consequently,
DsPH were not always in the best place for strategic in-
fluence in the council.
Commissioning processes and people involved
Decision-making within councils was found to be very dif-
ferent to that within PCTs. Decisions about how to spend
money were subject to a greater range of decision makers
and wider consultation, both across the council and
amongst the public, than before. Elected members are the
key decision makers within councils; the role of officers,
including those in public health, is to support them.
Elected members, therefore, were influencing the priorities
and actions of the public health team, sometimes overtly
and sometimes more subtly. 92% of elected members
responding to our survey (N = 38) said they felt always able
(45%) or quite often able (47%) to influence the priorities
of the public health team. In our case studies, we saw how
this influence might operate more subtly, perhaps accord-
ing to the ideologies and interests of the elected member,
or the politics of the council. For instance, in one
Conservative-led council, the elected member explained
that he would have a very difficult job persuading his cabi-
net to significantly increase spending on smoking cessa-
tion: “They’re not particularly interested in it, they think …
‘oh well if people smoke themselves silly, let them smoke
themselves silly’” (elected member, council, site A).
Compared with the NHS, local councils take different
approaches to prioritisation and commissioning, influ-
enced in part by over 15 years of implementing ‘Best
Value’1. The processes of commissioning (and new pro-
curement laws) within a council have had to be learned
by incoming public health staff. At the same time, public
health staff have tried to educate councillors in public
health commissioning.
Several commissioning officers who had worked within
councils prior to the reforms (e.g. in adult or children’s so-
cial care directorates) and who moved, following the re-
forms, into the public health teams, talked about
differences they observed in how commissioning was
done. One, referring to her incoming public health col-
leagues, explained:
“We were faced with a lot of ignorance about
commissioning - local authority style commissioning
and business processes - amongst our colleagues… I was
shocked actually by the lack of understanding of what
we had been doing or what we did [as local authority
commissioners]” (commissioner, council, site B).
Another talked about the differences between commis-
sioning in PCTs and commissioning in the councils. She
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explained that “public health has commissioning respon-
sibilities now in a way that they didn’t in the old PCT”.
She described commissioning in the former PCTs as
comparatively less ‘robust’, with less accountability, and
less scrutiny of performance and outcomes data:
“there’s much stronger scrutiny in local government
and that’s all areas of business and it’s something that
we’ve had to really work with our providers in NHS
specifically around understanding” (commissioner,
council, site A).
From the point of view of providers, however, the
sometimes rather narrow outcomes-based scrutiny that
services were now subjected to was not always appropri-
ate for complex public health interventions. For in-
stance, the provider of a range of obesity prevention
services in one of our case study areas complained that
the focus on outcomes in terms of body mass index re-
ductions belied the fact that most of their time and re-
sources were spent on engaging communities and
developing relationships with schools and others. The
outcomes of this type of activity, however, are impossible
to measure.
Having a distinct public health grant for the first time
enabled DsPH to take a different approach – a more
strategic approach - to the allocation of the public health
budget. A public health officer in one of our sites de-
scribed how, in the PCT, they were sometimes left
‘scrabbling’ around for funds, when public health prior-
ities and PCT priorities were not always well matched.
However, with a ring-fenced budget, they were able to
plan how best to match spending against their local pri-
orities. The leader of a council in site A explained how
they were prepared to completely shake up the way in
which the public health grant was spent: “We’ve got to
start at reviewing; is that delivering to the right priorities
or not? Is it value for money or not? And what should we
stop doing and what should we start doing?” Indeed, this
process of whole-scale service reviews for specific areas
(such as obesity) was demanded by councillors in all of
our case study areas. For public health officers, this
sometimes gave them the freedom to pursue quite differ-
ent approaches.
Decision-making across the local system following the
reforms was intended to be more co-ordinated. However,
with commissioning responsibilities now fragmented be-
tween NHS England, PHE, local councils and CCGs, our
research found that co-ordination was proving to be diffi-
cult. Moreover, the lack of clarity about responsibilities
sometimes led to delays in the commissioning of services,
and/or tensions in the relationships between organisa-
tions. Commissioning across an obesity pathway, for in-
stance, involves councils (for broad obesity prevention
and non-intensive weight management services), CCGs
(for specialist obesity services) and NHS England (bariatric
services) [17, 18]. Across England, we know that there are
significant gaps in this pathway, with a particular lack of
specialist obesity services [19, 20]. Following the reforms,
there was a great deal of confusion about whose responsi-
bility it was to commission these services.
It is clear that, as with many public health interventions,
if weight management and obesity prevention services are
to achieve their objectives, primary and community care
providers play a vital role. The presence, absence, type and
success of health improvement services commissioned by
councils have important implications for NHS work.
However, there is now a greater disconnect between pub-
lic health officers and NHS commissioners. In response to
our survey, 48% of DsPH (N = 69) said they felt ‘less able’
to influence local CCGs than before the reforms. In our
case study sites, we found that evidence of meaningful en-
gagement between public health teams and CCGs was
limited. This HWB chair felt that CCGs had become dis-
engaged from public health:
“I think we’ve got to persuade the CCG that, in
particular, public health is everybody’s business, it’s
not just the local authority’s business. … they see
public health as a separate entity at the moment,
and not part of an integrated health economy”
(Chair HWB, council, site C).
HWBs were meant to be the mechanism for co-
ordinating commissioning across NHS, social care and
public health at the strategic level. Our survey found
that amongst DsPH (N = 65), 48% felt the HWB was
‘definitely’ instrumental in identifying the main health
and wellbeing priorities, and 45% felt it had ‘definitely’
strengthened relationships between commissioning orga-
nisations. However, less than 5% felt that the HWB was
‘definitely’ making difficult decisions, and only 28% felt
that it had ‘definitely’ begun to address the wider
determinants of health. A further complication with co-
ordinating across the system and addressing wider deter-
minants is that in two-tier councils, many of the
functions that public health are expected to work across
are based in multiple lower-tier district councils. Public
health officers must therefore build relationships with a
greater number of different organisations, all with their
own priorities and ideas. In addition, these district coun-
cils often have a limited voice on HWBs. It is perhaps
partly for this reason that some HWBs were not seen to
be significantly engaging with the public health agenda.
As this HWB chair explained:
“We have a very strong focus on integration, Better
Care Fund – all that side of things. I’m conscious
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sometimes of an element of criticism … there’s always
a challenge to say, ‘Are you actually thinking enough
about long term determinants and all the sort of public
health agenda’ …” (Chair HWB, council, site A).
What has changed?
Our research suggested that, as a result of the reforms,
public health commissioning was changing on a number
of levels. Firstly, money was being used in different ways.
One indication of this was the way in which the ring-
fenced public health budget was being used to invest in
other departments in the majority of councils (see Fig. 1).
Given the huge cuts councils were having to make, most
DsPH felt that, now the public health budget was con-
tained within the council, it was expected to contribute
to the overall savings they needed to make. Many
seemed reconciled that the budget would now be used
to fund other services – in many cases, services that
would have been cut (e.g. children’s centres) had public
health funding not been available. And in our case stud-
ies, public health officers talked about the opportunities
this sometimes presented, in terms of embedding public
health activities and objectives within other council ser-
vices and providing more joined-up ways of thinking
and working.
Secondly, there were many changes being made to the
commissioning of health improvement services (see
Fig. 2). The move to local government prompted public
health commissioners to look at services and contracts
anew. In addition, councils tended towards shorter con-
tracts and more frequent retendering of services than
the NHS. All our respondents had started the process of
retendering within 2 years. But we also saw the majority
of responding authorities (N = 64–67) having set up new
services (73%), changed provider of existing services
(90%), re-designed existing services (94%) and de-
commissioned services (69%). In our case study areas we
saw that extensive commissioning changes were some-
times occurring as a result of changes in local area ar-
rangements, for instance, where several areas (former
PCTs) were brought together into one (council). Other
commissioning changes, however, were as a result of ser-
vice reviews that were very critical of service outcomes.
Our surveys asked for more information about
changes that were being made to obesity commissioning.
DsPH commented that they were wanting to move away
from ineffective schemes, increase their focus on chil-
dren, use new providers and create a more integrated
pathway. All these changes were resulting in insecurity
in the provider landscape.
Finally, there were changes to the size and profile of
the public health teams responsible for commissioning
health improvement services. DsPH were asked whether
there had been changes in the last 12 months to the size
and composition of their public health team. 28% (N =
72) reported that they had fewer public health special-
ists. 15% reported they had more business managers/
commissioning support staff, and 22% (N = 54) said they
had more ‘other’ staff (not falling into the DPH, special-
ist, analyst or commissioning support categories). In our
case study sites, public health officers talked of the need
to address skill gaps within their team in response to
working in the new environment. In one of our sites, for
instance, the public health commissioning team (made
up of non-public health specialists) had been signifi-
cantly bolstered. The team of public health specialists
had been correspondingly reduced.
It was not easy to tell, at this juncture, whether these
observed changes in commissioning had resulted in a
significantly different set of activities being commis-
sioned. However, there were early signs of some general
shifts occurring. In three of our case study areas, we ob-
served a shift towards the commissioning of more holis-
tic ‘healthy lifestyle’ services, bringing together weight
management, smoking cessation, alcohol reduction, sex-
ual health services, and so on. In two of our councils, we
saw a shift (at least in rhetoric) towards ‘whole council’
approaches, for instance, where they were seeking to ad-
dress a broader range of factors influencing obesity, par-
ticularly by working across council departments. We
Fig. 1 Use of public health budget to invest in other council departments in previous 12 months
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witnessed a greater recognition of public health objec-
tives and expected outcomes in a wider range of council
services as a result of public health investment. And we
saw public health staff working hard to influence the
wider workforce. Particularly during the transition
phase, as public health were settling into their new
homes, a number of programmes including learning
events, information sharing, and engagement events
were targeted at elected members and non-public health
officers across the council.
Discussion
The reforms expressed a clear intention to simplify and
streamline a previously complex, fragmented system. The
transfer of public health responsibilities into local councils
was to ensure that public health outcomes were embed-
ded across a council’s functions. The creation of HWBs
was to ensure strategic direction across organisations.
The functions of the now extinct PCTs were spread
across CCGs, councils and provider organisations, creat-
ing a more complex organisational picture than before
the reforms, with more complex accountability and gov-
ernance structures. Moreover, there was continued
upheaval in the system, with elements such as CCGs
and public health teams merging, the PHE regional tier
‘downsizing’, and local councils constantly restructuring
as they tried to cope with substantial budget cuts. Frag-
mentation is a problem common to many health
systems, and is a condition related to the tendency
within health care planning to focus and act on the parts
without adequately appreciating their relation to the
evolving whole [21]. There is a constant challenge to
create a system focused on relationships across the
whole – whole people, whole systems, whole communi-
ties. It is often these relationships across the whole that
suffer in the context of financial restraint and continual
change [22].
The move of public health into local councils in England
created a new working environment for commissioners,
public health practitioners and providers. Our findings
have demonstrated how, in this new environment, existing
public health capacity has been both freed and stifled.
Public health professionals have the opportunity to take
on a more significant role in shaping local places, but will
need to find a balance between ‘service’ public health and
academic ‘social medicine’ [23].
The considerable literature on decentralisation sug-
gests that the transfer of authority and resources to local
government might offer significant opportunities to im-
prove access to health and other care services, to provide
services that are better aligned to needs and local prefer-
ences, and to allow for increased flexibility and transpar-
ency [24–26]. However, the reforms in England simply
moved public health responsibilities at the local level
from executive decision-making bodies (PCTs) to demo-
cratically governed councils. Whilst PCTs had the same
73%
90%
94%
69%
100%
69%
68%
87%
58%
94%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Set up any new services directed at health
improvement
Changed provider of exisng services
directed at health improvement
Re-designed exisng services directed at
health improvement
De-commissioned services directed at
health improvement
Started the process of re-tendering
services
Percentage of respondents saying 'yes' (DPH surveys)
2015 (N=64-67) 2014 (N=81-83)
Fig. 2 Changes made by councils to services commissioned under public health budget in last 12 months
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‘local’ focus as councils, they were historically more dir-
ectly accountable to central government, and, with a few
exceptions, were poor at developing local ‘bottom-up’
methods for making NHS services more user-responsive
[27]. Councils, on the other hand, have been subject to a
longer experience of competitive tendering and service
commissioning than the NHS [28], and tend to have a
more structured approach for community engagement
and user-involvement embedded in their organisational
culture [29]. As a result, there appears to have been a
shift in how public health commissioning is performed,
from a more specialist-led investment approach to a
more ‘business’-orientated approach adopted by many
local councils, using best value frameworks.
In the new environment, there seems to be more op-
portunity for variation across the country in what activ-
ity is commissioned, and in who provides it (as well as
how, where and to whom). The Localism Agenda [9]
gives councils more freedom to innovate, to both drive
down costs and meet local needs [30]. Considerable dis-
cretion was afforded to individual councils to interpret
the full and detailed scope of their new functions and
services [31]. This was important, given the independ-
ence of councils as democratic organisations, but it
means that public health decision-making is now less
amenable to central government control.
In the absence of strong central control, it is important
to question the extent to which local problems can be
solved locally without risking geographical inequity of ser-
vices which underpin basic human rights [32, 33]. For the
next couple of years, the annual public health budget de-
volved to local government in England will be around £3.3
billion (reducing by an average of 3.9% every year in real
terms until 2020) [34]. Prior to the reforms, this budget
would have been spent by PCTs, who were accountable
for that spend to the DoH, via regional NHS authorities
(now abolished) who were mainly concerned with overall
NHS expenditure and financial sustainability of NHS
healthcare services. Following the reforms, whilst the pub-
lic health outcomes framework gives a clear sense of out-
comes the DoH expects to see, the accountability for
spending money is much weaker. Beyond a basic report to
the Department on how the budget has been spent, there
is very little role for formal state-driven accountability. In
a way most uncharacteristic of the NHS, PHE has empha-
sised that it is there to support local councils, not per-
formance manage them. Instead, there is a reliance on
sector-led improvement, whereby councils review and
support each other’s performance [35]. In addition, public
health commissioning is coming under much closer scru-
tiny from elected members within the local council. Our
research supported the idea that we can expect to see in-
creasing variation in services, but it is far from clear what
impact this will have on variations in outcomes.
Public health officers moving from the NHS to local
councils have sometimes struggled to adjust to this dif-
ferent relationship with central government. From the
point of view of commissioners, the lack of guidance
and clarity from Government was often found to be un-
helpful. In particular, public health officers expressed the
need for more timely information, for instance, regard-
ing responsibilities for commissioning across the frag-
mented system, or how the in-year budget cuts would be
implemented [36]. In the absence of detailed informa-
tion, public health teams were sometimes forced to
make commissioning decisions based more on expedi-
ency than on need. In the new system, the DoH is de-
fined as the ‘system leader’, improving people’s health
and wellbeing through its stewardship of the public
health system [37]. The concept of health stewardship
implies a broad over-arching responsibility over the
functioning of the system as a whole and, ultimately,
over the health of the population [38]. However, we sug-
gest that central government in England has yet to re-
solve some important stewardship issues, particularly
around its role in securing resources, balancing compet-
ing interests and demands, and assuring delivery in the
context of localism and the move of public health into
local government. Moreover, there was little in our re-
search to suggest that PHE have sufficient capacity, or
have yet developed the strong relationships required, to
provide meaningful support to local partners in the de-
livery of their vision.
Public health officers have also had to adjust to differ-
ent roles and relationships relative to other actors at
local level. Directors of public health were previously
key decision makers on the executive boards of PCTs.
Whilst they were often the first to be pushed back if cuts
were required or budgets exceeded, DsPH had clear au-
thority with regards to public health prioritisation. Fol-
lowing the reforms, they are expert advisers to elected
members. Leadership for public health is more dis-
persed; decision-making is now more complex, and ar-
guably subject to greater political ideology and personal
interest. There may also be unforeseen consequences
arising from the outcomes-based scrutiny of complex
public health interventions, and from increased insecur-
ity within the provider landscape. Many public health in-
terventions require a long time-frame in which to bring
about significant population health improvements. This
doesn’t sit well with the short-termism of contemporary
politics. As local councils struggle to cope with tighter
budgets, public health officers may find it harder to con-
vince their elected members of the added value of some
of the public health services they commission.
Our research has highlighted the huge amount of
change occurring in the commissioning (and decommis-
sioning) of health improvement services in England.
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Whilst it will be important for the wider health system
that key public health services are protected and im-
proved (for instance, in smoking cessation, weight man-
agement and sexual health services), the public health
specialists will need to capitalise on bringing about posi-
tive change through closer integration with the strategy
and activity of the council. Commissioning for health
improvement requires commissioners to focus on the
modifiable determinants of health, taking a pro-active
approach to improving individuals’ life chances and re-
ducing social inequalities, rather than waiting until
people are already ill and commissioning reactively.
Local councils, due to their wider scope and responsibil-
ities, are better placed than the NHS with its largely
clinical orientation, to address a broad range of determi-
nants, such as lifestyles, community, local economy and
activities [30]. Our research, like the many case studies
highlighted in a range of Local Government Association
reports [39–42] has identified a range of positive exam-
ples where stronger and more direct public health in-
volvement and influence across councils has brought
about new opportunities. In their new ‘home’, and with the
right support from their council, public health officers can
be afforded the freedom to approach public health chal-
lenges in new ways. Local councils are also more adept
than NHS organisations at broader level consultation and
community engagement, which might afford new oppor-
tunities in line with the Ottawa Charter recommendations
for public participation and empowerment [43].
The NHS continues to have a vital part to play in popu-
lation health improvement, and the reforms hoped to bring
about improved synergies between public health, NHS and
social care. However, with public health moving ‘arms-
length’ to the NHS, both health services commissioners
and providers are becoming more remote to the local pub-
lic health systems. Moreover, the vital co-ordination role of
HWBs is not always working well locally [10]. Some health
improvement services could, as a result, end up being dis-
connected from each other and from wider support. Simi-
larly, services that are crucial to the achievement of health
service objectives (such as reducing premature mortality
from the major causes of death), but which are commis-
sioned or provided by the council (e.g. weight manage-
ment, smoking cessation and alcohol services), are at risk
of being cut or changed. Our research has highlighted that
there is much change in the way public health commis-
sioning is done, who is doing it, and what is commissioned.
Time (and further research) will tell if these changes are to
result in improved outcomes and reduced inequalities.
However, until there is a strong sense of shared ownership
across local systems, and ‘whole system’ commissioning at
local level, any opportunities afforded by the reforms to the
public health system might be outweighed by the chal-
lenges of fragmentation and budget cuts.
Conclusions
We found that the system created by the reforms was
confused, continually changing, and - from the point of
view of commissioning - more fragmented than before.
In some ways, the move of public health into councils
has brought about some of the opportunities associated
with decentralisation – in particular, allowing for in-
creased flexibility. However, most public health commis-
sioners were essentially moved from one local
organisation (NHS), to another (council), so the compar-
isons with decentralisation are limited. In this new local
environment, former public health capacity has been at
the same time freed and stifled. Public health commis-
sioning is being more strongly influenced by a new set
of decision-makers in the form of democratically elected
councillors, with their own local knowledge, ideologies,
and experiences. Meanwhile, many councils are bringing
a more business-oriented approach to bear on public
health commissioning, with greater scrutiny of outcomes
in relation to spend. This is challenging the public health
specialists and provider organisations, and changing the
shape of health improvement services. Whilst we can ex-
pect to see increasing change and variation in services
across England, it is far from clear what impact this will
have on outcomes and on variations in outcomes.
Endnote
1The Duty of Best Value makes clear that councils
should consider overall value – including social value –
when considering service provision. Under the general
Duty of Best Value, local authorities should “make ar-
rangements to secure continuous improvement in the
way in which its functions are exercised, having regard
to a combination of economy, efficiency and effective-
ness” https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/best-
value-statutory-guidance–4.
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